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ABSTRACT: The present paper presents a conceptualization of human behavior involved in
terrorism from a Relational Frame Theory perspective. Relational frame theory is a contemporary
behavior analytic account of human language and cognition. This account has yielded answers to
many substantial empirical and theoretical psychological questions that have puzzled psychologists
for some time. We believe that relational frame theory can and does account for the behavior of
terrorists, those persons affected by terrorists acts directly and indirectly, as well as the entire culture
of a country at large. This paper outlines the current state of psychological affairs regarding terrorism
in the United States of America, traces the evolution and application of relational frame theory, and
describes the prejudices that may follow from a terrorist attack or contribute to terrorist recruitment.
Implications for scientists and practitioners are also presented.
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The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 have left a permanent scar on
the United States of America. This scar runs much deeper than the destroyed
buildings and the countless numbers of innocently lost lives. These terrorist attacks
will remain as a reminder that the world is no longer a safe place to live, and that
even the USA is vulnerable to catastrophic dangers from unknown persons from
remote parts of the world. Many nations have lived with such a fear for centuries.
Until now, the United States has not. The veil of security covering the USA
population has been removed forever.
Many changes have taken place in USA as a result of the September 11th
attacks. They include new airline boarding policies, a nation-wide terrorist alert
warning system, tightened patrolling of the nation’s boarders, the creation of the
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Department of Homeland Security, and a call for all United States citizens to report
any suspicious behavior to local law enforcement. Cities now plan for terrorist
strikes by running mock scenarios of chemical or biological warfare attacks. The
US Postal Service now irradiates mail to political leaders, and warns its customers
not to open any packages from unknown senders. Changes continue to occur in all
aspects of US culture. One change that only recently to emerge is the
psychological effects on our nation’s population.
There has been an increase in persons across the country that are now seeking
psychological services of clinicians for posttraumatic stress disorders related to
September 11th (Meisenhelder, 2002; Thobaben, 2002). Many United States
citizens appear to have an increased need for human contact (Alper, 2002) and
religious affiliation as a means of coping with such stress and devastation
(Meisenhelder, 2002). Evidence also suggests that there was a 4.9% nation-wide
rise in antidepressant prescriptions for 6 months following the attacks when
compared to the 6 months prior to the attacks (Kettl & Bixler, 2002). Case reports
are still surfacing in the published literature of persons who have been more
tempted to commit suicide now than before the attacks (Duggal, Berezkin, & John,
2002). More American citizens now fear unknown persons of Middle Eastern
descent. Indirect effects of changes to USA’s psychological perceptions can also
be found throughout many aspects of society, particularly within the Middle-
Eastern American community.
A report by the Council on American-Islamic relations (CAIR, 2002) has
stated that over 60,000 Muslim-Americans have been negatively affected
psychologically, and sometimes physically, following the September 11th, 2001
attacks. Their data include 1,200 Muslims singled out and detained by immigration
officials and “treated as if they were terrorists.” Other reports have documented
5,000 legal visa holders being asked to submit to “voluntary interrogations” (Deen,
2002). Other incidents of psychological distress include workplace discrimination
whereby individuals were terminated or denied employment because of religious
appearance; the refusal to accommodate religious practices in the workplace,
schools, and prisons; the searching of individuals at airports because of their
distinct names, appearances, and travel destination; the detention or interrogation
of Muslims by federal and local authorities based on profiling criteria; and the
denial of services or access to public accommodation facilities because of religious
or ethnic identity (CAIR, 2002). Some 1,516 incidents of threats, discrimination,
harassment and even physical attacks have been reported, while some 2,200 people
were “targeted because of actual or perceived religion and ethnicity” (Swarthyguy,
2002). The fallout from the September 11th attacks continues to impact the daily
lives for persons of Middle Eastern descent within the United States in several
ways; from suspicious glances, to cruel words and threats, to outright violence.
The stage has been set for a war with an unfamiliar enemy whose most salient
features are skin color and cultural practices unfamiliar to many Americans. The
reasons why many United States citizens are stereotyping the average Middle
Eastern American as a terrorist can be accounted for through a psychological
theory entitled Relational Frame Theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche,
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2001). This theory can also account for why persons from far away lands may
come to hate the USA and its people when they have never even met a citizen of
the United States.
The Foundations of Relational Frame Theory
Over the past 30 years, behavior analysts have begun to make serious
scientific headway in the conceptual and empirical analysis of human language and
cognition and their roles in a whole host of complex human behaviors, including
prejudice and discrimination (see Hayes, Niccolls, Masuda, & Rye, 2002; Roche,
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Hayes, 2001; Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Stewart, & O’Hora, 2002). The rapid acceleration of language and
cognition research has been made possible by the identification of a phenomenon
known as stimulus equivalence (Sidman, 1986) which has until relatively recently
attracted sparse scientific attention within the behavioral sciences. In order to
illustrate the stimulus equivalence phenomenon, we will outline a traditional
laboratory procedure typically used to study this effect. Letters and numbers are
used for illustration purposes to notate where different stimuli would be presented.
A participant is presented with a series of stimulus-matching tasks. For
example, a sample stimulus (e.g., a Chinese character) is presented in the center of
a table or computer screen, and two comparison stimuli are presented below it
(e.g., nonsense syllables or abstract images). Let’s call the sample stimulus A1 and
the comparison stimuli B1 and B2, respectively. The participant’s task is to choose
between B1 and B2 conditional upon the sample stimulus. Feedback on
performance is presented after each trial. The subject must choose B1 when A1 is
the sample, but on another task choose the B2 comparison when A2 is the sample
(we call this performance a conditional discrimination). Two further tasks are also
presented in which either A1 or A2 is again presented as a sample, but in which
two further stimuli, C1 and C2, are presented as comparisons. On these trials the
subject must choose C1 when A1 is the sample, and choose C2 when A2 is the
sample.
When the foregoing tasks are presented repeatedly, a participant becomes
competent at performing the two conditional discriminations. That is, he or she can
relate both B1 and C1 to A1 and both B2 and C2 to A2. What is particularly
exciting, however, is that new relations then emerge between the stimuli without
further feedback, reinforcement, or instructions (See Figure 1). More specifically,
participants will spontaneously match A1 to B1, A1 to C1, A2 to B2, and A2 to C2
(i.e., reverse all the taught relations, or demonstrate symmetry) and derive new
relations between the B and C stimuli (i.e., match B1 to C1 and B2 to C2, or
demonstrate transitivity). When this occurs, the stimuli involved have formed
derived equivalence relations (c.f., Sidman, 1986; see also Barnes, 1994; Fields,
Adams, Verhave, & Newman, 1990).Derived stimulus relations, such as stimulus
equivalence, have proved very exciting to behavioral researchers because (a) their
emergence is not predicted by traditional behavioral accounts, and (b) they appear
to parallel many natural language phenomena.
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Figure 1. Equivalence relations trained and derived to result in the relation that “All Irish are dim-
witted.”
Another exciting feature of derived relations that is of particular importance in
the context of prejudice is the derived transformation of functions. Specifically, if a
behavioral function is established for one of the stimuli in an equivalence relation,
the function of other related stimuli is transformed accordingly. For instance, if the
C1 stimulus in the foregoing example is associated explicitly with a frightening
stimulus, such as brief electric shock, then B1, but not B2, will also likely acquire
fear-eliciting functions based on its derived equivalence relation to C1 (see
Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994; Roche & Barnes,
1997; Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, & McGeady, 2000, for
relevant empirical evidence; see also Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000, for a review). We
will consider the importance of this phenomenon for the analysis of prejudice and
its prevention in subsequent sections. An important question to ask at this point,
however, is where does the ability to derive stimulus relations come from?
Relational Frame Theory
Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001)
provides a functional-analytic account of the development of derived relational
responding skills across the lifespan. According to RFT, the emergence of
language and associated cognitive skills depends upon the establishment of an
appropriate repertoire of derived relational responding by the social community
(Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000; see also Healy, Barnes-Holmes, &
Smeets, 2000; Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993). For example, in early language
training children are exposed to object naming exercises in which teachers directly
establish the skills necessary for derived relations to emerge between words,
objects, and events. Children are often presented with objects and asked to say or
repeat their names (e.g., “This is a ball. What is it?”). We can describe this
interaction as; see Object A, hear Name B and say Name B. Children are also
taught to orient toward objects when their names are stated (e.g., “Show me the
ball”). We can describe this interaction as; hear Name B, then orient towards
Object A. In early stages of language training each object-word and word-object
relation is explicitly trained by the teacher. However, when a child has been
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provided with a sufficient history of relational training, generalized relational
responding may emerge. That is, the child will eventually be able to produce a very
wide variety of meaningful utterances with only a limited set of words and sounds.
Suppose, for example, that a child with this history of naming is taught “This is
your toy”. Contextual cues (such as the word “is” and the context of the social
interaction) predict that if this object is a “toy” (Object A, Name B), a “toy” is this
object (Name B, Object A). Consequently, the child may now identify the object
when asked “Where is your toy?” in the absence of prior training for doing so.
Thus, RFT approaches derived relational responding as a type of generalized
operant behavior (Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000).
 Once a basic repertoire of relational responding is established, it can be
brought under increasingly subtle forms of contextual control. For instance, a
young child may be easily taught to point to a ball from an array of three toys (e.g.,
Which one is the ball?”). In this case, the word “is” likely functions as the
contextual cue that controls pointing to the ball object given the word “ball” (i.e., it
specifies their equivalence). However, in time the child will also be exposed to
more complex tasks in which the contextual cue is subtly changed to effect an
entirely different response. For instance, a teacher may ask; “Which toy is bigger
than the ball?” Now the phrase “is bigger than” functions as the contextual cue that
controls the choice of a toy other than the ball. Through such concrete exercises
sufficient contextual control may be established for phrases, such as “bigger than”,
“smaller than”, “opposite to”, and so on, that they too may become generalized and
applicable to a wide variety of objects and events, some of which may bear
relationships to each other which are entirely arbitrary and not identifiable form
their formal features. As a specific case in point, most children learn to respond to
a dime as “more than” a nickel, even though the formal features of the relata
suggest the reverse (i.e., a dime is actually smaller than a nickel). When reliable
patterns of relational responding come under the contextual control of
environmental cues (e.g., the words “more than”), those patterns are referred to as
relational frames.
A wide variety of studies have now been conducted that demonstrate the
human ability to respond in accordance with relational frames, such as Sameness,
Opposition, and Difference (Steele & Hayes, 1991; Roche & Barnes, 1996, 1997),
More than and Less than (Dymond & Barnes, 1995; O’ Hora, Roche, Barnes-
Holmes, & Smeets, 2002), and Before and After (O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche,
& Smeets, in press; see also Barnes & Roche, 1996; Hayes & Barnes, 1997).
The relevance of derived relational responding to the study of prejudice and
its prevention has already been noted by RFT researchers (e.g., Hayes, et al., 2002;
Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Hayes, 2001; see also Roche, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & O’Hora, 2002). Indeed it would appear that a
greater scientific understanding of derived relations and the transformation of
functions can extend considerably the traditional behavioral understanding of
prejudice. For instance, Staats & Staats (1958) found that a dislike of specific
nationalities could be generated in the laboratory context by directly associating
the names of those nationalities with unpleasant words. They asked participants to
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remember words paired with various nationality names, such as “German-table,”
“French-with,” “Dutch-gift,” and “Swedish-failure.” For one group of participants,
the target nationality “Dutch” was always followed by a word with a positive
evaluative meaning, and the target nationality “Swedish” was always paired with
negative words. This evaluative pairing was reversed for a second group of
participants: “Dutch” was paired with negative words, and “Swedish” was
followed by positive words. Each participant then rated on a Likert scale how they
felt about the various nationality groups. The group that heard favorable word
pairings with “Dutch” and negative pairings with “Swedish” had more positive
attitudes toward the Dutch and less positive attitudes toward the Swedes. These
ratings were reversed for the group that had opposite word pairings.
An analysis of nationality preferences in terms of derived stimulus relations,
however, extends upon the Staats and Staats analysis by incorporating a further
process by which words, and other events, such as faces, skin color, and names,
might acquire aversive functions for an individual. More specifically, research into
derived stimulus relations has suggested that an individual may not necessarily
learn from peers, parents, teachers, or popular media that, for example, the Irish are
a little ‘dim-witted’ in order to respond to the first Irish person they meet on this
basis (cf. Roche et al., 2001). They might instead be told on one occasion that the
Irish are a nation of heavy drinkers, and on another occasion that heavy drinkers
are usually a little dim-witted. Based on what we know about the prevalence of
derived relational responding in human language, these directly taught relations
should suffice for the derivation of a relation of equivalence between the terms
“Irish” and “dim-witted”. Thus, while an unfounded prejudice against Irish people
may not be directly taught by members of the wider community, it may effectively
be established by modes of discourse concerning the Irish as a nation. As we shall
see, Relational Frame Theory, as a theory and technology of language, provides
the empirical and conceptual tools for the analysis of such modes of social
discourse and their roles in the establishment, maintenance, and amelioration of
prejudice and racial hatred.
How Relational Frame Theory Can Explain the Formation of Prejudice,
Racism, and Terrorism
Relational frame theory may explain how many Americans have developed
prejudices towards Middle Eastern persons who have no ties to the September 11th
terrorist attacks. Take for example a white American male who learns about the
attacks on television early that Tuesday morning. He is watching the news, and
finds out that someone has hijacked four planes, two were flown into the World
Trade Center, one flown into the United States Pentagon, and one has crashed into
a field in Pennsylvania. Using the previously described notion of stimuli and
events, let us call the terrorist attacks themselves, “A”. Immediately our white
American male experiences feelings of rage. Let’s call his emotional responses of
rage and hate, “B”. Reporters on the news claim that terrorists are responsible for
these terrible acts, and depicts their pictures on the television set. Let’s call the
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images of the terrorists, “C”. Following from relational frame theory, the images of
the terrorists themselves may now come to elicit feelings of hate or rage through a
transfer of function across the stimuli in the newly created relational frame. As
noted above, given A related to B, and A related to C, B will become related to C.
Now, when our white American male sees pictures of the suspected terrorists in the
newspapers or on TV he may become rather emotional and possess feelings of
hate. This should not come as a surprise. However, the relational network does not
stop here.
The most salient features of the unknown terrorists are their race, religion, and
country of origin and are described as such by the media. Specifically, the
terrorists are Middle Eastern males, fighting a holy war against America, and they
live in Afghanistan. Actual names of the terrorists may be provided, but are not
attended to as easily as the other features. The generalization of feelings of hate
and rage towards the terrorists begins to transfer to other persons sharing the same
skin color, religion, and country of origin because of a formal similarity between
them and the terrorists. Let’s call the innocent members of a Middle Eastern
descent, “D”. The Middle Eastern man at the corner store “looks just like” the
terrorists on television to our American male. The group of Muslims in town who
go to church and pray every day “have the same faith” as those terrorists in
Newsweek to our American male. The neighbor down the block is “from the same
country” as the terrorists. He may now be considered suspicious to our American
male. The formal properties of the C stimuli and the D stimuli now make these
two, previously separate groups of people, approximately the same through
stimulus generalization. Moreover, the feelings of hate and rage held by our
American white male that were initially occasioned only by the terrorist attacks
now have transferred beyond the terrorists themselves. They have transferred to
innocent Middle Eastern persons. A racist has evolved from a once neutral young
man.
A relational frame theory account can also explain the behavior of an
unknown Middle Eastern male who comes to hate America and Americans so
much so that he will die for that cause. Take for example a relatively young Middle
Eastern male living in Afghanistan. At the age of 18 this young gentleman begins
to struggle with how he will earn a living and make ends meet. Perhaps he just has
learned that he will need to go hungry for the next few days because food is not
available in his town. Let’s call his current state of economic affairs and hunger,
“A”. Our young Middle Eastern male is outraged by his never ending struggle for
food and money. Let’s call this outrage, “B”. Yet, who should our young man be
outraged at? He can not be angry with his family or his fellow town’s people for
they are experiencing the same conditions that he is. However, one day upon a trip
to the downtown area he overhears a group of other men speaking about how it is
“America’s fault” that there is no food. It is “America’s fault” that everyone is so
poor. And, “in America, everyone is fat, rich, and has swimming pools.” Let’s call
these comments about America causing the depressed conditions in Afghanistan,
“C”. Now our young Middle Eastern male will transfer his emotional responses of
outrage from “A” to “C”, while never actually directly experiencing an American
DIXON ET AL.
136
person or the country at large directly impacting his life. However, the relational
network does not stop here.
Our young Middle Eastern male may also see that his new acquaintances in
downtown appear not to be as bad off as himself. In fact they are eating food, have
clean uniforms, and speak about the many virgins promised to them upon the
completion of their holy war against America. Let’s call this ideal state of affairs
of the Taliban army, “Y”. This ideal state of affairs is surely opposite to our young
man’s state of affairs, as mentioned before, “A”. Also opposite of our young man’s
state of affairs is a feeling of happiness and pride in himself. Let’s call these
feelings, “Z”. Now, through a similar transfer of stimulus functions, our young
man begins to believe that feelings of happiness and pride are equivalent with
joining the Taliban army. In notation, if A is opposite of Y and A is opposite of Z,
then Y is the same as Z. A terrorist has evolved from a once neutral young man.
While the two illustrated examples of relational frames depict an explanation of
rather troublesome human behavior, more positive human behavior can evolve in
the similar fashion.
Using Relational Frame Theory to Help Eliminate Prejudice, Racism and
Terrorism
Traditionally, prejudice is thought to be extremely resistant to change, mainly
because the processes that define it are so ubiquitous among human beings (Hayes
et al, 2002; Roche et al., 2001, 2002). The verbal evaluative and categorical
processes that underlie prejudice and the perpetration of acts of terror based upon it
are core features of the generative nature of human language and cognition. A
member of Islamic Jihad, for instance, need not directly experience martyrdom for
that outcome to be reinforcing. It is enough that the act of martyrdom itself
participates in a whole host of relations with other verbal events, self-statements,
and derived consequences (e.g., “to die now and become a martyr would be the
supreme act of allegiance to the word of Allah and help to defeat the infidels;” see
also, Hayes, 1992). In this analysis, prejudice and terror acts involve a derived
transformation of the functions of certain individuals or groups based on often-
indirect contact with a few members of the prejudiced group (Roche et al., 2001,
2002). Cultural interventions aimed at reducing prejudice can maximize what is
known about these derived processes and seek to re-inform attitudes and opinions.
In general, media-driven and common sense educational approaches to
reducing prejudice will always fail for several reasons. First, educational
instructions about the prejudiced group usually refer to group membership and thus
may paradoxically help to increase group membership. In other words, the
instructions “don’t believe that all Muslims are terrorists” (See Figure 2) functions
to increase the salience of “Muslims” as a categorical concept and adds features to
the category. Noticing this process is relatively easy when a novel group is
involved. For instance, consider the statement “don’t believe that all tall sumo-
wrestlers are bad, they are excellent cooks”. This statement may form a category of
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Figure 2. RFT depiction of how the instruction, “Don’t believe all Muslims are terrorists” can add
features to the category of Muslims.
“tall sumo-wrestlers” that had never been formed before, and hence verbally
attribute features to the entire group (i.e., “excellent cooks”).
The second reason that common sense educational approaches are doomed to
failure is that educational instructions aimed at reducing prejudice may actually
strengthen stereotypes via derived relational responding. Denouncing stereotypical
views only serves to actualize some of the prejudicial functions because, by
definition, common stereotypes are readily available in the verbal repertoire of
most members of a culture. Hence, one stimulus (e.g., “West Bank”) will likely
prime another (e.g., “Gaza Strip”) whether or not someone is explicitly taught to
form this relation (see Fazio, 2001, for a review of affective priming).
The final reason anti-prejudice education may fail is that it may serve to
increase the aversiveness of groups by adding negative functions to already
established prejudiced thoughts. The vast literature on thought suppression
demonstrates that efforts at suppressing the frequency of intrusive (prejudicial)
thoughts, although initially successful, will lead to a cumulative increase in the
frequency and behavioral impact of the intrusive thoughts over the long-term (see
Purdon, 1999; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Hence, the less willing
you are to have an unwanted thought about a prejudiced group, the more likely it is
that you will have it.
Consider, for instance, the instruction “It is sad to think that Hamas are intent
on destroying the state of Israel.” This instruction is likely to not only increase the
salience of the group Hamas as an entity in its own right, but it also specifies that
the one should avoid thinking of Hamas and its aims. As suggested above, this
common-sense strategy used by people wishing not to feel sad about the current
state of terrorism in the world may well increase the frequency of the unwanted,
prejudiced thought, and to an avoidance of situations that might give rise to it
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(such as news coverage and even progressive discussions of the Middle East peace
process).
The paradoxical effect of common sense attempts to deal with prejudicial
thoughts has been demonstrated in a wide-variety of studies (e.g., Purdon, 1999;
Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Smart & Wegner, 1999; Wegner,
1994) and is readily predicted by RFT (Wilson, Hayes, Gregg, & Zettle, 2001).
Specifically, thought suppression involves an active search for, and rehearsal of,
thoughts other than the thought to-be-suppressed. According to one researcher,
once a prejudiced thought is suppressed, “more and more stimuli become relevant
to the thought, and serve as cues for it. These cues are readily detected…and,
through their association with the target thought, actually evoke it. Thus, the very
processes used in the service of suppression work to elicit the thought” (Purdon,
1999, p. 1030).
According to RFT, the failure of thought suppression works as follows. When
an individual has, for instance, the thought, “I must not think of Muslims as bad”, a
bi-directional relation is established between “Muslims” and “bad”. The relational
quality of human language and cognition means that these events (i.e., “Muslim”
and “bad”) acquire the functions of each other. Thus, the avoidance effort actually
strengthens the relation between the two events and the transformation of their
functions (i.e., Muslims may become more and more bad each time the thought is
rehearsed). This problem highlights that verbal relations about prejudice will only
be further strengthened and elaborated by any direct attempt to undermine them.
Cultural Interventions Based on RFT
A more effective method of reducing prejudice may be to create contexts that
reduce the psychological importance of categorization per se. For instance,
inducing a context of relaxation has been shown to influence the ability of
clinically-anxious persons to form verbal relations involving terms or phrases that
might otherwise be difficult for them (e.g., a relation between anxiety-provoking
words and more positive words; see Burns, 2001; Leslie, Tierney, Robinson,
Keenan, Watt, & Barnes, 1993). This dilution of some of the functions of verbal
relations through relaxation makes it more likely that new verbal relations will be
formed even when those relations conflict with older stereotypes (e.g., thinking of
a Northern-Irish Catholic politician playing a Protestant Lambeg drum; see Watt,
Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns, 1991). The foregoing suggests that it may be possible
to change the very context in which verbal relations are formed, and in this way to
loosen up rigid verbal relations that characterize stereotypes and prejudices. One
study by Clayton (1995) attempted to do just this within a human service
organization. This study was concerned with identifying and changing beliefs
commonly held by staff about their work environment. Staff who believed that the
work environment was “chaotic” showed greater attitude change when their
previously identified positive attributes about the organization were linked to
existing negative beliefs in a persuasive speech made by the director of the
organization. Specifically, the speech intervention related negative attributes (e.g.,
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Figure 3. How adding elements to an existing verbal network through a verbal intervention can
change thinking and behavior.
“chaotic”) to desired attributes such as “creative” and “caring” and described how
the employees can help move towards these desired goals. In effect, the positive
functions of events identified by the employees transformed the functions of the
negative events to which they became related (See Figure 3). Thus, it emerged that
adding elements to an existing verbal network in an attempt to change thinking and
behavior is much easier than building up a set of new verbal relations (i.e., ways of
thinking and talking).
Another effective method of preventing prejudice may be to reduce the
likelihood of unwanted derived transformations of functions occurring in the first
instance. One way in which this can be achieved is through the use of mindfulness
interventions, in which people are taught to “stand back from”, or to” just notice”
prejudicial thoughts without reacting to or evaluating them (Hayes et al., 1999).
When an .individual is mindful of a stereotype, watching it without evaluating it,
the context for the transformation of functions is extremely broad. For instance, the
individual is not trying to avoid the thought, think of its opposite, judge how bad or
good it makes them feel, compare it to other stereotypes, and so on. Thus, the
number of ways in which its functions might transform is myriad. Indeed, what
appears to happen in mindfulness exercises is that the functions of all events that
come to mind, both positive and negative, can together help to transform the
functions of the stereotype such that the individual’s opinion of the stereotype
broadens enormously (See Figure 4). For example, in addition to negative
stereotypical thoughts, the person in question may now also have thoughts relating
to the diet of Muslims, the typical climates they live in, the Arabic word for televi-
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Figure 4. Example of a mindfulness intervention transforming the functions of a stereotype such that
the individual’s opinion of the stereotype broadens.
sion, and so on. Thus, a context of mindfulness can “dilute” the transformation of
functions effect by increasing the number of functions that come to bear when the
individual next thinks of Muslims. The mindfulness approach has proven
successful in reducing prejudicial attitudes and behavior towards the physically
disabled (Langer, Bashner, & Chaowitz, 1985). What we need now, however, is
further research to investigate the potential of mindfulness techniques for use with
large groups of individuals.
Closely related to mindfulness is another therapy-based technique known as
deliteralization (Hayes et al., 1999). Deliteralization involves the repetition of
negative terms or statements until they become meaningless and nothing more than
a series of sounds (the reader can try this by repeating the word ‘Hamas’ as fast as
possible 100 times). Deliteralization, has been successfully used in the treatment of
paraphilias (LoPiccolo, 1994) and appears to work by stripping away the layers of
meaning that are attached to each and every word in the human lexicon. In this
way emotive terms related to prejudice and terrorism, such as “9/11,” “al Qaeda,”
and “axis of evil,” among others, can have their potent meanings dramatically
reduced through systematic repetition. Consequently, reflex reactions towards
aggressors are less likely to occur. This technique may be familiar to many readers
as that used by gay rights activists by the proliferation of the term “queer” in order
to strip away its negative functions.
Perhaps one obvious way of ameliorating prejudice is to facilitate direct
contact with members of prejudiced groups through cooperation. Community
interventions targeting children and adolescents from stigmatized groups can be
extremely effective in reducing prejudicial attitudes towards these groups
(Desforges, Lord, Ramsey, Mason, Van Leeuwen, & Lepper, 1991). In one famous
example by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, William, & Sherif (1961; see also Sherif,
1956), a three-phase field study was conducted with twenty, 11- to 12-year old
boys at a specially created summer camp. In the first phase, two in-groups were
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created in which each group of boys separately engaged in recreational tasks and
developed their own leaders and unique social identity (the “Rattlers” and the
“Eagles”). During the second phase, Sherif examined whether inter-group
competition would cause prejudice by having the Rattlers and the Eagles compete
against each other in a weeklong athletics tournament. Sherif noted that friendships
were of the in-group variety and inter-group hostility, as manipulated through
competition, lead to an increase in in-group solidarity and negative attitudes
towards the out-group. In the final phase of the study, the idea was to reverse the
inter-group hostility by arranging simple non-competitive contact between the
groups. Following a co-operative effort at re-instating the camp’s water supply and
rescuing the camp bus, the negative out-group stereotypes declined and out-group
friendships soon flourished. This study illustrates that not only is inter-group
hostility established through competition, but that prejudice and stereotypes can be
reduced by arranging direct, co-operative contact between groups on some
mutually-shared goal.
According to RFT, the direct contact between groups increases the number of
functions attached to each group member and massively expands the
transformation of functions. In effect, “terrorist” is then not the only function that
comes to mind when someone hears the word “Muslim,” or “infidel” is not the first
thing that comes to mind when someone else hears the word “American.”
One important aspect of this varied contact with the outside or feared group is
that it forces the formation of multiple, hierarchical, and overlapping categories
concerning out-group members. That is, instead of merely describing someone as a
“terrorist”, it is more likely that a composite picture of an individual in terms of
being a son/daughter, husband/wife, worker, teacher, or priest will reduce
prejudice and instead shift the focus to the religious or political motivation behind
them being considered a “terrorist” in the first place (see Taylor, 1988).
The Research and Political Agendas that Lie Ahead
In order to further our understanding of the role of relational responding in the
formation of cultural biases and prejudices, a number of potential research
questions come to light. Indeed, in order for wide scale interventions designed to
reduce stereotypes and misunderstandings of other cultures to be successfully
implemented, a strong research foundation illustrating the processes involved is
imperative. It is hoped that these suggestions will inspire behavioral scientists to
launch research programs that will address these issues. However, it will take more
than occasional, scattered studies here and there to provide the necessary
foundation on which a technology of behavior change can be based. University
labs must make this the focus of their research pursuits. Collaboration between
labs will be necessary. Graduate students in the behavioral sciences must learn the
behavioral processes underlying cultural stereotypes as a regular part of their
educational curriculum. Journal editors must make explicit efforts to publish
manuscripts on these topics. Finally, as our knowledge base builds, federal grant
programs must make it a priority to fund research programs that address these
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issues. What follows are suggested themes on which basic laboratory, applied
clinical, and applied community projects might focus.
A preliminary foundation for the role of derived stimulus relations in
Americans’ attitudes towards terrorism was established by Dixon, Rehfeldt, and
Zlomke (under review), and Dixon, Zlomke, and Rehfeldt (under review), whose
results showed slower acquisition and reduced likelihood of equivalence class
formation when the relata were American and terrorist images. However, it was
possible for subjects to nonetheless acquire derived relations between those
stimuli. Future research should focus on replicating these results. Several other
research questions can also be addressed using this same procedure. The extent to
which derived stimulus relations promoting cultural stereotypes can be established
on the basis of observation merits investigation. Children often acquire stereotype
views from growing up in a household or region where such views are frequently
expressed. As such, a direct history of reinforced relational responding may not be
necessary for a child to demonstrate derived stimulus relations, but simply
observing another individual demonstrate the stimulus relations may be sufficient.
A Middle Eastern child may grow up observing the reinforcement of his father’s
descriptions of Americans as evil, greedy, power monger who should be
suppressed. The child may then derive relations accordingly—power mongers are
Americans, to be evil is to be an American, and the like. Recent research has
shown that children can derive relations of sameness after simply observing other
children be reinforced for making the baseline conditional discriminations
(Rehfeldt, Latimore, & Stromer, in press). In future research, subjects might be
required to observe others receive reinforcement for conditionally relating negative
words and cultural emblems, and then be tested to determine whether they, in fact,
derived relations between those words and the cultural emblems simply on the
basis of observation. If so, observational learning may provide a powerful
explanation for how cultural stereotypes based on derived stimulus relations
become so pervasive.
Another important area of investigation concerns the generalization of derived
stimulus relations to novel stimuli that are physically similar along some
dimension to an original training stimulus. A number of studies have shown that
derived stimulus relations do in fact generalize to novel dimensional variants of
training stimuli, thus making the number of stimuli that can potentially enter into a
derived stimulus relation infinite (see Fields & Reeve, 2001; Fields, Reeve,
Adams, & Verhave, 1991; see also Rehfeldt & Hayes, 2000; Rehfeldt, 2003;
Rehfeldt & Root, in press). For example, if a training stimulus is a red square,
some dimensional variants might include orange squares or red rectangles. The
transfer of functions to stimuli physically similar to an existing class member has
also been shown to generalize to physically similar stimuli (Fields, Adams,
Buffington, Yang, & Verhave, 1996). Generalization may explain the widespread
prejudices that are formed against all members of an existing culture, despite the
fact that a person has had experience with only one member of the culture. For
example, many Americans’ negative views towards al Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden transferred to all persons of Middle Eastern descent. For some, these views
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might have been strongest towards men wearing white robes and who have long
gray beards. For others, generalization on the basis of skin color may have been
sufficient. An investigation might, for example, establish derived relations between
cultural emblems, derogatory words or phrases, and abstract geometric figures.
Having done this, we could then test the generalization of those relations to
geometric figures similar along a dimension such as hue to the original figures. If
many dimensional variants were now shown to have entered into a relation of
sameness with the cultural emblems and the negative words, we would have a
laboratory analogue of the generalization of prejudice.
Future research must not only focus upon the behavioral processes by which
cultural stereotypes are established, but also the behavioral principles that may
inspire effective interventions for reducing such stereotypes. An obvious step in
this direction would be to attempt to alter the problematic derived stimulus
relations and reestablish new networks that promote more favorable attitudes. A
laboratory study might, for example, establish the stereotyped relations described
previously, but then train the same cultural emblems to more positive words or
phrases. We might examine how resilient to changes in the contingencies subjects’
responding is, and consider whether direct punishment for the previously
established stereotyped relations is necessary to eliminate them. Further
intervention may be required for subjects to acquire the new relations. As
previously noted, Burns (2001) and Leslie et al. (1993) explored the role of
relaxation training on the ability of clinically-anxious patients to form verbal
relations that would otherwise have been difficult or impossible. Laboratory
experiments might also investigate the role that relaxation training might have on
the readiness with which problematic verbal relations are destroyed and more
adaptive verbal relations are established.
Wide scale investigations of clinical applications are also in order. Further
demonstrations of the efficacy of the “mindfulness” approach, which was
previously shown to be successful in changing attitudes towards persons with
physical disabilities (Langer et al., 1985) are necessary. Its effectiveness in
reducing prejudices towards persons of other cultures remains to be seen.
Deliteralization is another clinical approach that awaits further research. For
example, if individuals with prejudices towards Middle Easterners are to repeat
negative terms over and over until the terms become meaningless, will subjects
show reduced stereotypes on subsequent rating scale assessments? The
effectiveness of community programs and practices should also be explored. As
previously discussed, individuals acquire a history of relational responding on the
basis of experience with exemplars. Many communities attempt to provide its
citizens with such exemplars, albeit unsystematically. The effects of multicultural
and heritage festivals on attitude change should be systematically explored.
In conclusion, we live in interesting times and great challenges lie ahead.
With the advent of global terrorism it should now be clear that the war to be settled
is not one based on laser-guided missiles and anthrax alone. Insofar as it is a war
based on hatred and fear, it is to that extent also a psychological war (see
Crenshaw, 2000). As psychologists we need to step up to the urgent challenge of
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using our technologies to reduce human suffering on an international scale and to
avert any further terrorist atrocities. This endeavor must to some extent be played
out on the political stage. What we hope to have demonstrated here, however, is
that a scientific functional-analytic understanding of prejudice and hatred may also
make a significant contribution to dealing with the changes we all now face. If this
is to be a war on several fronts, then we must ensure that we make the war on
prejudice be a briefly fought and bloodless one.
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